Doesn't your suggestion of a possibility of "a developing “cosmic organism” from which emerges every form of life" contradicts the doctrine of logoi - the unchangeable divine ideas of the generic natures of the creatures? Doesn't philosophical realism is based exactly on this Orthodox Christian doctrine?
I didn’t realize next time would some so soon! Ya know, Alex, you’re gaming the system a bit by using these posts that allow free subscribers to comment. I fear I’m doing a disservice to those who pay for the luxury of posting comments.
Alas, I can answer this briefly. No. Presuming this question is about part 2 of evolution piece, I make clear in there the Eastern patristics commitment to realism and make clear this is the heart of my objection to the theory as typically explained.
The cosmic organism concept does not violate realism but uphold it — and is found in certain Eastern fathers, like Athanasius.
The reason is simple. The realist must account for things like development and even metamorphosis. An embryo, for example, develops through cell division various organs and bodily members until a complete human person exists. The realist understands this unfolding to be material potential unfolding in accord with the form within it, the structures moving from potential to actual. The human form, for example, includes the sub-forms of heart, liver, lungs, etc. So as matter develops, bringing into concrete reality the form human, this includes all its parts.
The cosmic organism concept simply suggests that our world develops in the same way, the form of our cosmos including all the creatures that compromise that cosmos. Hence, as Athanasius says, God makes one creature, the cosmos. But that one Creature includes the entire chain of being, just as the nature of man includes the sub-natures of organs and cells and subatomic particles.
You said, I am going around the system with this comments, so I thought, when I have some comments piled up in the future, I could pay for a month of subscription and post them.
Dr. Jacobs, I have found another quote to correct another inaccuracy: if I understood you correctly you was saying that God the Son is obeying God the Father. That's what st. John writes about it:
"Moreover, the blessed Paul the Apostle says, He became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. Philippians 2:8 But obedience is subjection of the real will, not of the unreal will. For that which is irrational is not said to be obedient or disobedient. But the Lord having become obedient to the Father, became so not as God but as man. For as God He is not said to be obedient or disobedient. For these things are of the things that are under one's hand , as the inspired Gregorius said. Wherefore, then, Christ is endowed with volition as man".
(St. John of Damask. On the Orthodox faith. Book 3. Ch. 14)
I don't want to be a person who doing nothing himself just criticizes others... I am sorry if such critics are annoying, but I really want your series to be as perfect as possible. I hope you are not annoyed too much with my comments.
Alex, no need for an apology. But to whatever extent you feel the need to offer one, I accept it.
No worries about the lengthy reply. I wrote it on the trip to Athos, and it helped pass the time. And perhaps it will do some onlooker good.
I’m glad you found the reply about obedience helpful. I enjoyed writing that, and I’ve never spoken to the issue directly.
As for the Trinity, I think reflecting on the “hive mind” concept may prove fruitful, as I suspect this may be lurking in the back of some of your thinking.
Now, wconcerning the obedience question, I would need to know the context in which I said this. I suspect it was when talking about Genesis and the fact that in the text God commands and then God obeys, and I noted the intentional echo of the Memphite creation myth where Ptah thinks of an archetype, declares let there be, and Atum obeys and creates a material copy. Or perhaps it was in the context of discussing the causal relations and the Father as the fount of divinity and the Monarch.
This one is a more nuanced issue. I mentioned that the Eastern fathers do not always resolve the apparent tensions between Christ’s two natures in the same way. For example, when explaining Christ’s words about the day or the hour, some argue he is speaking about his humanity when including himself amongst the ignorant, while Basil reads this as an acknowledgment of his eternal begetting — that all that he has, including his knowledge, is native to the Father and shared with him by eternal generation. When talking about the Father being greater than him, there are two different explanations in the Eastern fathers. The one is that he is speaking about his humanity. So by humbling himself to the lowly estate of a creature and taking on that nature, he makes himself suitably of the station of a creature. The other explanation, found in figures like John of Damascus, is that he is speaking about causation and headship. That is to say, just as Adam has a certain priority as the first man from which all others come and as the head of the household or original patriarch (even though all other humans are equal in nature), so the Father is the First Principle of divinity, begetting the Son and outbreathing the Spirit, and this is also why there is a paternal headship even in the Trinity.
When it comes to obedience or doing the will of the Father, earlier writers, such as Justin Martyr or Origen are perfectly comfortable speaking about the Son obeying the will of the Father — as God. And I admit that this early language doesn’t trouble me if understood in keeping with the qualifications of the later fathers. My position is very much like that of Basil on the term “homoiousia”: There’s nothing wrong with the word, but since it has been tainted by the Arians, he’ll relinquish it. Such is my stance on talk of obedience.
Following the Arian dispute, the Eastern fathers became more squeamish about such language, as the quote from John of Damascus shows. But they still recognized a distinction of persons and a distribution of activity or varied roles. In addition, they continue to recognize the Father as the first principle or cause or Monarch. But they move away from obedience language to executing language — the Son naturally executes the will of the Father. The worry, in Basil, about “obey” language seems to be about Arianism, where the Son might be ignorant of the Father’s will without a command or have the type of autonomy that might allow for disobedience. Instead, the Fatter and Son share a common will, such that when the Father wills, it is natural for the Son to execute that will. Such becomes the preferred framing in these later fathers.
However, two things should be noted here. The first is that common will should never be taken to again return to the composite person or hive mind concept. The Eastern fathers consistently qualify the point to insist that the Son really does have the capacity of will, an insistence found in Basil's On the Holy Spirit and Gregory's Great Catechism, for example. In other words, they are concerned to avoid turning the Son into a mindless or will-less appendage — hence always repeating that the Son is not void of will.
Second, and closely related, it is critical to recognize that, according to these same fathers, will belongs to nature but is exercised by a person. The common will is thus an affirmation of a common nature — being divine, or having the divine nature, they have a common divine will, since the divine nature is rational and volitional. But such is true of you and me. Being human, you and I have a common, human will, despite us using or exercising the powers of will differently. In short, will is an abstract power that wills nothing; persons having the volitional nature exercise the power of will. The point is essential to their Christology and understanding of the gospel, where Christ appropriates and heals all aspects of our (common) nature.
Yes, we again get the same caveats noted above: You and I are materially separate and autonomous in ways the Trinity is not. And these differences mean that we might disagree and oppose one another, while such is impossible for the persons of the Trinity. But these caveats do not change the facts that (a) the common nature refers to the fact that divinity is a rational, volitional nature that the three share, just as human nature is a rational and volitional nature that we share, and (b) this abstract nature does not will anything; the persons having it are the ones who will things; so the commonality is not the basis for harmony, as if “common” indicates "composite person" or “hive mind”; rather, the general distinctions between the created and the uncreated noted above are what produce this harmony which is uncharacteristic of creatures.
Given these points, even these later fathers acknowledge that the Son executes or does the will of the Father, acknowledging the Monarchical reality that the will being done originates with the Father. I think obedience is a fine word for such realities, which is why earlier fathers use it. But I also acknowledge that the later fathers are worried about implications attaching to the term because of Arian and other such heretics.
Now, returning to why I find your approach to “correcting me” unhelpful. When you presume your misunderstanding of me or of the fathers is correct and proceed to proclaim in a long thread that I’m ignorant of or misrepresenting the fathers (when I’m neither) followed by a barrage of quotes (with which I’m already familiar), you give the onlooker the impression that you are correct — that I’m ignorant of this or that nuance or have misrepresented the fathers or that your misunderstanding is correct. This forced me into a position of needing to reply at length (as I am now), which is something I don’t have time for, given my more pressing obligations, but feel impelled to do for the sake of the onlooker.
What would be a more sober and useful approach would be something like this: “Dr. Jacobs, when you employ Gregory’s three human persons analogy, do you mean to suggest there are no differences between created hypostases and divine hypostases?” This brief question avoids the false accusation of ignorance and misrepresentation and allows for a concise reply — "Certainly not. See this, this, and this article."
In the future, I would ask that you take this approach.
Dr. Jacobs, somehow we read the same Letter to Ablabius and the same passages from John of Damasc, but understand them differently. Perhaps, st. Gregory Palamas had managed to express the same teaching in a more nuanced manner, so that this time our understanding of what he means will be the same. Please, read a little more quotes below to see, if it will be so or not.
It seems to me, that your comparison with the "hive mind" comes exactly because of what st. Gregory writes about the incomprehensibility of the matter in question: "It is such because it is completely unparticipating. Therefore, not even an example of this can be found in creation". - It may seem to us being something rediculas, but this is a question of faith, of trust to the Holy Fathers, through whom the Holy Spirit speaks. It is a pass between the two extremes: belief in the supersimple Divine Nature with its three inner relations and in "three Gods" in the meaning of three separate hypostases .
The treatise "On Divine Union and Distinction" (35 chapters) was written by St. Gregory Palamas in 1341 and is dedicated to the interpretation of the work "On the Divine Names" from the corpus "Areopagitica". The title of the work in Greek is Ποσαχῶς ἡ θεία ἕνωσις καὶ διάκρισις, καὶ ὅτι μὴ κατὰ τὰς ὑποστάσεις μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὰς κοινὰς προόδους καὶ ἐνεργείας διάκρισιν ἐδιδάχθημεν ἐπὶ θεοῦ, καὶ ὅτι καθ᾿ ἕνωσίν τε καὶ διάκρισιν ἄκτιστον φρονεῖν παρελάβομεν αὐτόν, κἂν Βαρλαὰμ καὶ ᾿Ακίνδυνος ἀπαρέσκωνται.
21. However, besides the two aforementioned unions of the Triune Godhead, there also exists a mutual indwelling of the hypostases within each other and perichoris, since They are wholly, constantly, and inseparably embraced by one another, so that the energy of the three hypostases is one. Not as with men, where the action of the three would be similar, but—since each acts independently—it is distinct. Not thus, then, but truly one and the same [energy in Them], since it is one movement of the divine will, produced from the immediately preceding cause, the Father, and sent down through the Son and manifested in the Holy Spirit. And this is evident from the results, for from them, as has been said, every energy becomes manifest. And so, not as with shoemakers, when each shoe is made differently, even though the labors of all of them were directed toward the same goal, so also with the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, the same result is seen from [the activity] of each of the hypostases. But every creation is a single work of Three, and we have learned from the Fathers, when considering it, to think of one and the same divine energy in the three adored Persons, and not distributed among each [of Them]. And since, according to the tradition of theologians, "Divinity" is primarily the name not of the Divine essence, but of Divine energy, we speak of one and the same divinity of the three adored Persons, but of "one" not in the sense of "similar" ( ομοιαν ), as [this is said] about the natural ( φυσικην ) or acquired and achieved by experience activity of three men.
22. So let Barlaam and Akindynos, who declare the very divinity of God in the proper sense to be created, and who madly write that "there is one thing without beginning and without end—the essence of God, and everything outside of it is created nature," understand this also. And also: "the only uncreated divinity is the essence of God, and everything around it is created." For the term "divinity" is the name of the divine energy, proceeding from the Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit and revealed to us through [its] results, and not the name in the proper sense of the word of the divine essence. For energy is the movement of essence, and not the essence [itself]. Whose movement and energy is this? Of God, of course! [...]
25. So, although we say this, everything pertaining to both the essential union and the hypostatic separation, and to the absolutely unconfused and unmixed fusion, remains super-unknowable and super-ineffable («… τα της ουαιωδους ενωσεως και της υποστατικης διακρισεως και τα της αμιγυς πανταπασι και αφυρτου συμφυιας»). It is such because it is completely unparticipating. Therefore, not even an example of this can be found in creation. For what can one say about an essence that cannot be expressed or even contemplated in any way? From this we can also conclude that the interconnection and distinction of the hypostases are completely incomprehensible. There are fathers and sons among us, having one nature, but not inseparable from one another, nor existing in one another. [...]
26. [...] Therefore, the great Dionysius, having resolved this question, then concludes his speech about these [subjects], saying: “Such, then, are the union and separation corresponding to the inexpressible unity”, for it is impossible to name them [starting] from creatures. For this reason, the Deity is above number rather than a monad, since it is not counted among the multitude; and above the monad [It] rather than number, since even in division It does not receive in addition [to Itself] anything else from what is outside, but is an indivisible number. Or rather, It is also one above [the observed] one among existing ones, being the most unique and in the proper sense of the word one, as the super-unit, and is counted, being divided, above all singular ( ενικως ) divided, [as] the only thing that, above all reason and word, ever confirms both the distinction of the united and the unity of the separated.
Firstly, except my apologies! Instead of telling you how your words may be perceived from the outside, I should have considered my own comments in the first place. More delicate and considerate person would represent questions in the manner you described. Alas, I am not such one... But I am learning. And your efforts may do some good in that regard. I am really sorry for forcing you to answer me at length while you don't have time for it!
Secondly, thank you very much for those lengthy replies anyway! Now I understand, how presumptuous I was, thinking that you somehow missed these nuances while I – well, I am another matter, right?! – know it...
The question about obedience is closed. You know even the whole story about how the language of the fathers changed in this regard. Excuse me again for jumping to conclusions!
The question about the mystery of the Holy Trinity remains. It is possible that it is me who may need to correct his view. I have to consider this problem of the hive mind as you called it. I will write you later, if you don't mind. I promise to take your suggestion seriously and try to follow it.
Alex, I recognize that your intentions are good — truly — but allow me to explain why I find these lengthy threads unhelpful.
Your “corrections” only illuminate for me how you have misunderstood the source material, misunderstood me, or where you have not listened fully to me. I understand that you intend this to be helpful, giving me a glimpse of how I might be misunderstood, but I don’t presume your misunderstandings are universal or necessarily the product of me failing to be clear on the points in question.
For example, you suggested in your thread on the Trinity two things. The first is that I fail to discuss the fact that the Trinity is undivided, unlike created hypostases of a common nature. Second you claim that the common energies (misrepresented in your comment as numerically one energy) is meant to temper Gregory’s three hypostases analogy. The former point grossly misrepresents my work; the latter misrepresents Gregory.
To the former, i have spoken at great length about the fact that created hypotheses are materially separate, differentiated by material accidents, casually brought about in a per accidens manner, and displaying general autonomy — along with other metaphysical necessities, such as mutability, turnability, temporality, etc. And I have been exceedingly clear that none of this applies to the Holy Trinity: The hypostases are distinct, not separate (explaining perichoresis in this context), distinguished by causal relations rather than material accidents (of which there are none because they are immaterial), displaying a per se casual relationship (as opposed to per accidens), which also entails no autonomy — along with the catalogue of negations, such as immaterial, immutable, atemporal, etc. I go through every one of these at length in my piece of the begotten not made distinction; I discuss these in my article on not there Gods; I explain them in a basic and truncated way (given the target audience) in my piece on understanding the Trinity; I touch on these in all my lectures on the Trinity, including the one published via my podcast. If you’ve missed this, the reason is not due to silence.
As for the point regarding Gregory, first, the energies are common amongst the persons, having a single source, namely the divine nature, but they are numerous — as Basil explains (the essence is one but the energies are many) and Gregory also explains, contra the Eunomians. As for why Gregory brings up the common energies when writing to Ablabius, the reason is not to show how the persons of the Trinity collapse into one or to blur the lines between them. The point is to demonstrate the common nature they share. If you understand what an energy is, then you understand it is an articulation or outward expression or operative power of a nature — and according to the Cappadocians, this is how we come to know a nature (any nature), not by direct access (since we have none), but by inference from its energies. By demonstrating common energies, he demonstrates the common nature of the persons. This is not a distinctive feature of the Trinity, however; you and I have common energies as well because we have a common nature. Now, are there differences between created and uncreated hypostases, including how we exercise our operative powers? Yes, as already noted and as I’ll get to further below. But such is not the purpose of Gregory raising the common energies.
And this goes to a rhetorical reason I begin where I do when discussing the Trinity. The children of Modernity and Latin theology generally have a tendency toward “monotheism,” not as the term is defined by the Eastern fathers (I.e., there is only one divine nature as opposed to several) but as a single subject. Hence there is a tendency to try to collapse the persons into a single person or a single lump called God, as if the persons were parts of a composite whole and this forth fellow is the real God. Such conceptions are false and utterly contrary to the Eastern fathers who are exceedingly clear about the absolute distinction of the persons; the nature is one but the persons are several. Hence, I think it imperative to first break this misconception — or better, smash this idol — and begin with the very analogy the terms used indicate: three subjects of a common nature. (Notice that Gregory’s letter to Ablabius is occasioned by the fact that Ablabius understands precisely what these words mean and thus asks if we believe in three Gods, and Gregory’s reply does not deny the meaning of the terms but only corrects Ablabius’ erroneous metaphysics that call Paul, Timothy, and Silvanus three humans as opposed to one human.) Once this starting point is firmly established, I then move into the sorts of qualifications needed to differentiate the created from the uncreated. But these qualifications should never return one to the idolatrous fourth fellow who represents one composite person or a divine hive mind or any such thing. And the way you characterize things in your concern leads me to suspect that you have such an error at work in your thinking and reading of the fathers.
Alex, I’ll reply to your other string of comments on the Trinity if I have time. But suffice it to say that the previous cluster of comments highlights nuances that I’m neither ignorant of nor silent about. To the contrary, I’ve both published and lectured on such matters. See my recent post on the begotten-not-made distinction, for example, which is a truncated version of my article in Religious Studies. I would add that some of your “corrections” in that thread are inaccurate in their characterization of such nuances — such as your framing of the common energies in Gregory’s letter to Ablabius. As for this comment, again, there is no inaccuracy to be spoken of. John’s point is that Christ really does have a human will that really displays obedience — hence the comment about the real as opposed to unreal will. And this means the person of Christ obeys, not the humanity of Christ, since the exercise of will is by the person who wields it, never by the abstract common power — the alternative being Nestorian. As for whether obedience is rightly ascribed to the instrument of the human will only or the divine as well goes into a nuance about how the fathers address certain seeming contradictions between the divine and the human natures in the person of Christ — compare comments on Christ’s knowledge of the day and hour, as an example, or about growing in wisdom or about the Father being greater than he— and you’ll find there is not uniformity in their “solutions,” and so, I, like them, have preferences concerning the best resolution, though all within the pale of acceptable Eastern patristic norms. While I appreciate your zeal, I don’t find these efforts to “correct” terribly helpful.
Excuse me then for such not asked for corrections! You may at least treat them as an example of what impressions may leave your podcast in the minds of the attentive listeners. There are some nuances which you do not mention, while generally describing the Orthodox theology, but which in my opinion should be mentioned in order to avoid leaving such impressions as I am describing.
Again excuse me and don’t perceive it as me trying to teach you how to make your lectures. I like them very much! I just voice my concerns about some important nuances, which in my opinion may lead the listeners to some non-Orthodox conclusions .
For example, correct me please, if I am mistaken , but the notion about the Son obeying the Father, as I remember, I have heard in your podcast about The Holy Trinity, not about the Incarnation. So I got an impression that you think that the Son obeys the Father always — even before the Incarnation .
Another example is when you do not mention, that in comparison with us The Holy Trinity is not just three hypostases of the same nature, but —inseparable and dwelling one in each other and not numerically countable and therefore one God, which cannot be said about us being separate hypostases of the same nature. And this is the mystery of the Holy Trinity, which disappears when such important distinction is not mentioned. But you promised to answer on this when you have time, maybe I do not understand something and got the wrong impression.
Excuse me again for occupying your time and thank you very much for your work!
Dr. Jacobs, hello and may you have a profitable lent!
I think you are making a very valuable and important work not only for those who may consider converting to Orthodoxy, but also for preserving them from being infected with the unorthodox ideas of the heresy of Ecumenism. May God grant you His help to finish this endeavor!
As your work is huge, no wonder you may overlook some inaccuracies in your explanations, so allow me to sound one particular critical concern.
When you are explaning why there are not three Gods, you appeal to the first part of the famous letter of st. Gregory of Nyssa, but usually do not mention the second part (or you make a very short remark on it, without explaining this argument fully). It leaves an impression that God is not very much different from man, because in both cases the only thing that prevents us from saying "three men" or "three Gods" is the fact that the three hypostases have the same essence and we inaccuratly call three hypostases of the same nature "three men" or "three Gods". The problem is that stopping explanation on this argument elliminates the mystery of the Holy Trinity.
When we are saying "three men", we actually mean three separate hypostases and not three different essences (at least in our age), while the mystery of the Holy Trinity teaches us to believe that uncomprehensable superessential essence of God has corresponding hypostases that dwell one in each other and have one will and one energy! This mystery defies our comprehention and contradicts all our creaturely experience.
Exuse me for reminding you this basics of Orthodox faith, but without actually speaking it out your audience may get a wrong impression, learning to believe in the other extreme: while western Christianity fell into conclusion that there are not three hypostases, but only three inner relations of the Divine nature to itself, your partial explanation may lead to believe, that there are "three Gods" in a meaning of three separate hypostases.
I just want to remind you that this is the main concern and such holy fathers as st. John of Damask and st. Fotius of Konstantinopol, who were summorising the whole Orthodox tradition, were speaking primarily about it.
____________________________________________
Now some quotes from their works:
1) St. John of Damask (On the Orthodox faith)
Chapter 8. Concerning the Holy Trinity
We believe, then, in One God ... one essence, one divinity, one power, one will, one energy, one beginning, one authority, one dominion, one sovereignty, made known in three perfect Hypostases and adored with one adoration, believed in and ministered to by all rational creation, united without confusion and divided without separation (which indeed transcends thought).
...
And just as we say that fire has brightness through the light proceeding from it, and do not consider the light of the fire as an instrument ministering to the fire, but rather as its natural force: so we say that the Father creates all that He creates through His Only-begotten Son, not as though the Son were a mere instrument serving the Father's ends, but as His natural and subsistential force. And just as we say both that the fire shines and again that the light of the fire shines, So all things whatsoever the Father does, these also does the Son likewise. (John 5:19)
...
And again we speak of the three Hypostases as being in each other, that we may not introduce a crowd and multitude of Gods. Owing to the three Hypostases, there is no compoundness or confusion: while, owing to their having the same essence and dwelling in one another, and being the same in will, and energy, and power, and authority, and movement, so to speak, we recognise the indivisibility and the unity of God. For verily there is one God, and His Word and Spirit.
(Or in translation from Russian: "And again we say that the three Hypostases are one within the other, lest we introduce a multitude and crowd of gods. Through the three Hypostases we understand the uncomplex and unmerged; and through the consubstantiality and existence of the Hypostases—one within the other, and the identity of will, activity, strength, power, and, so to speak, movement—we understand the indivisibility and existence of the one God. For truly there is one God, God, and His Word, and His Spirit".)
Concerning the distinction of the three Hypostases: and concerning the thing itself and our reason and thought in relation to it.
One ought, moreover, to recognise that it is one thing to look at a matter as it is, and another thing to look at it in the light of reason and thought. In the case of all created things, the distinction of the hypostasesis observed in actual fact. For in actual fact Peter is seen to be separate from Paul. But the community and connection and unity are apprehended by reason and thought. For it is by the mind that we perceive that Peter and Paul are of the same nature and have one common nature. For both are living creatures, rational and mortal: and both are flesh, endowed with the spirit of reason and understanding. It is, then, by reason that this community of nature is observed. For here indeed the hypostases do not exist one within the other. But each privately and individually, that is to say, in itself, stands quite separate, having very many points that divide it from the other. For they are both separated in space and differ in time, and are divided in thought, and power, and shape, or form, and habit, and temperament and dignity, and pursuits, and all differentiating properties, but above all, in the fact that they do not dwell in one another but are separated. Hence it comes that we can speak of two, three, or many men.
And this may be perceived throughout the whole of creation, but in the case of the holy and superessential and incomprehensible Trinity, far removed from everything, it is quite the reverse. For there the community and unity are observed in fact, through the co-eternity of the Hypostases, and through their having the same essence and energy and will and concord of mind, and then being identical in authority and power and goodness — I do not say similar but identical — and then movement by one impulse. For there is one essence, one goodness, one power, one will, one energy, one authority, one and the same, I repeat, not three resembling each other. But the three Hypostases have one and the same movement. For each one of them is related as closely to the other as to itself: that is to say that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one in all respects, save those of not being begotten, of birth and of procession. But it is by thought that the difference is perceived. For we recognise one God: but only in the attributes of Fatherhood, Sonship, and Procession, both in respect of cause and effect and perfection of Hypostasis, that is, manner of existence, do we perceive difference. For with reference to the uncircumscribed Deity we cannot speak of separation in space, as we can in our own case. For the Hypostases dwell in one another, in no wise confused but cleaving together, according to the word of the Lord, I am in the father, and the father in Me (John 14:11): nor can one admit difference in will or judgment or energy or power or anything else whatsoever which may produce actual and absolute separation in our case. Wherefore we do not speak of three Gods, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, but rather of one God, the holy Trinity, the Son and Spirit being referred to one cause, and not compounded or coalesced according to the synæresis of Sabellius. For, as we said, they are made one not so as to commingle, but so as to cleave to each other, and they have their being in each other without any coalescence or commingling. Nor do the Son and the Spirit stand apart, nor are they sundered in essence according to the diæresis of Arias. For the Deity is undivided among things divided, to put it concisely: and it is just like three suns cleaving to each other without separation and giving out light mingled and conjoined into one. When, then, we turn our eyes to the Divinity, and the first cause and the sovereignty and the oneness and sameness, so to speak, of the movement and will of the Divinity, and the identity in essence and power and energy and lordship, what is seen by us is unity. But when we look to those things in which the Divinity is, or, to put it more accurately, which are the Divinity, and those things which are in it through the first cause without time or distinction in glory or separation, that is to say, the Hypostases of the Son and the Spirit, it seems to us a Trinity that we adore. (Or in translation from Russian: then there will be Three [Persons] Whom we worship.)
Chapter 10. Concerning divine union and separation.
... Further, the true doctrine teaches that the Deity is simple and has one simple energy, good and energising in all things, just as the sun's ray, which warms all things and energises in each in harmony with its natural aptitude and receptive power, having obtained this form of energy from God, its Maker.
But quite distinct is all that pertains to the divine and benignant incarnation of the divine Word. For in that neither the Father nor the Spirit have any part at all, unless so far as regards approval and the working of inexplicable miracles which the God-Word, having become man like us, worked, as unchangeable God and son of God.
from Chapter 12
Wherefore, of the divine names, some have a negative signification, and indicate that He is super-essential: such are "non-essential"... Some again have an affirmative signification, as indicating that He is the cause of all things. For as the cause of all that is and of all essence, He is called both Ens and Essence. ... These, then, are the affirmations and the negations, but the sweetest names are a combination of both: for example, the super-essential essence, the Godhead that is more than God, the beginning that is above beginning and such like.
God then is called Mind and Reason and Spirit and Wisdom and Power, as the cause of these, and as immaterial, and maker of all, and omnipotent. And these names are common to the whole Godhead, whether affirmative or negative. And they are also used of each of the hypostases of the Holy Trinity in the very same and identical way and with their full significance. For when I think of one of the hypostases, I recognise it to be perfect God and perfect essence: but when I combine and reckon the three together, I know one perfect God. For the Godhead is not compound but in three perfect hypostases, one perfect indivisible and uncompound God. And when I think of the relation of the three hypostases to each other, I perceive that the Father is super-essential Sun, source of goodness, fathomless sea of essence, reason, wisdom, power, light, divinity: the generating and productive source of good hidden in it. He Himself then is mind, the depth of reason, begetter of the Word, and through the Word the Producer of the revealing Spirit.
From Chapter 13.
... The Son is from the Father, and derives from Him all His properties: hence He cannot do ought of Himself. For He has not energy peculiar to Himself and distinct from the Father.
+ + +
2) Saint Photius, Patriarch of Constantinople (from Amphilochius in translation from Russian)
Question 182. How do we say that the Deity is one and three?
... That the Trinity is not countable in the proper sense, can be seen from what has been said above, and various other considerations also show. For with regard to those who are countable in the proper sense, such as, say, men or angels or many other things, we can say both "a trinity of angels" and "a trinity of men," but also "three angels," "three men." But of the Most Holy Trinity, which surpasses all understanding and all number, no pious person would say either "a trinity of Gods" or "three Gods." Again, the Persons in the Most Holy and life-giving Trinity, preserving [Their] peculiarities inviolable and untouchable, seem to permeate one another (ὡς δι᾿ ἀλλήλων χωρεῖ): the Father fulfills all things, the Son fulfills all things, and so does the Holy Spirit; and vice versa, where the Spirit is present, there is also the Son and the Father, but also in that in which the Son is present, with Him are both the Father and the Spirit, and among those who are numbered in the proper sense, one cannot even think of anything like that.
Moreover, among the properly numbered, there is both addition and subtraction of numbers, but how can this even be conceived of in the superessential and incomprehensible Trinity? And much more could be imagined.
How can I buy this course from Russia? I have been trying to get a subscription, but there was no available way of paying. We are placed here under a collective responsibility...
Maybe I will be able to pay through my friend, but how can I let you know, that it is me, who has signed up for the series East and West and not my friend?
Hey Alex, send an email to thenathanjacobspodcast@gmail.com to let me know your friend's name and I'll make a note. I'd love to make it easier for people to purchase with us internationally. I'll have to look into this. Thank you so much for your support!
Dr. Jacobs, another question if you allow:
Doesn't your suggestion of a possibility of "a developing “cosmic organism” from which emerges every form of life" contradicts the doctrine of logoi - the unchangeable divine ideas of the generic natures of the creatures? Doesn't philosophical realism is based exactly on this Orthodox Christian doctrine?
I didn’t realize next time would some so soon! Ya know, Alex, you’re gaming the system a bit by using these posts that allow free subscribers to comment. I fear I’m doing a disservice to those who pay for the luxury of posting comments.
Alas, I can answer this briefly. No. Presuming this question is about part 2 of evolution piece, I make clear in there the Eastern patristics commitment to realism and make clear this is the heart of my objection to the theory as typically explained.
The cosmic organism concept does not violate realism but uphold it — and is found in certain Eastern fathers, like Athanasius.
The reason is simple. The realist must account for things like development and even metamorphosis. An embryo, for example, develops through cell division various organs and bodily members until a complete human person exists. The realist understands this unfolding to be material potential unfolding in accord with the form within it, the structures moving from potential to actual. The human form, for example, includes the sub-forms of heart, liver, lungs, etc. So as matter develops, bringing into concrete reality the form human, this includes all its parts.
The cosmic organism concept simply suggests that our world develops in the same way, the form of our cosmos including all the creatures that compromise that cosmos. Hence, as Athanasius says, God makes one creature, the cosmos. But that one Creature includes the entire chain of being, just as the nature of man includes the sub-natures of organs and cells and subatomic particles.
Christ is risen!
Alright, I will refrain from leaving any other comments on new topics, just finish with the ongoing ones after reflecting on raised problems.
By the way, have you managed to find a way how to make payments directly from any part of the world or is Russia completely blocked?
Remind me what you’re trying to make payments on?
You said, I am going around the system with this comments, so I thought, when I have some comments piled up in the future, I could pay for a month of subscription and post them.
Dr. Jacobs, I have found another quote to correct another inaccuracy: if I understood you correctly you was saying that God the Son is obeying God the Father. That's what st. John writes about it:
"Moreover, the blessed Paul the Apostle says, He became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. Philippians 2:8 But obedience is subjection of the real will, not of the unreal will. For that which is irrational is not said to be obedient or disobedient. But the Lord having become obedient to the Father, became so not as God but as man. For as God He is not said to be obedient or disobedient. For these things are of the things that are under one's hand , as the inspired Gregorius said. Wherefore, then, Christ is endowed with volition as man".
(St. John of Damask. On the Orthodox faith. Book 3. Ch. 14)
I don't want to be a person who doing nothing himself just criticizes others... I am sorry if such critics are annoying, but I really want your series to be as perfect as possible. I hope you are not annoyed too much with my comments.
Alex, no need for an apology. But to whatever extent you feel the need to offer one, I accept it.
No worries about the lengthy reply. I wrote it on the trip to Athos, and it helped pass the time. And perhaps it will do some onlooker good.
I’m glad you found the reply about obedience helpful. I enjoyed writing that, and I’ve never spoken to the issue directly.
As for the Trinity, I think reflecting on the “hive mind” concept may prove fruitful, as I suspect this may be lurking in the back of some of your thinking.
Until next time…
(Part 2)
Now, wconcerning the obedience question, I would need to know the context in which I said this. I suspect it was when talking about Genesis and the fact that in the text God commands and then God obeys, and I noted the intentional echo of the Memphite creation myth where Ptah thinks of an archetype, declares let there be, and Atum obeys and creates a material copy. Or perhaps it was in the context of discussing the causal relations and the Father as the fount of divinity and the Monarch.
This one is a more nuanced issue. I mentioned that the Eastern fathers do not always resolve the apparent tensions between Christ’s two natures in the same way. For example, when explaining Christ’s words about the day or the hour, some argue he is speaking about his humanity when including himself amongst the ignorant, while Basil reads this as an acknowledgment of his eternal begetting — that all that he has, including his knowledge, is native to the Father and shared with him by eternal generation. When talking about the Father being greater than him, there are two different explanations in the Eastern fathers. The one is that he is speaking about his humanity. So by humbling himself to the lowly estate of a creature and taking on that nature, he makes himself suitably of the station of a creature. The other explanation, found in figures like John of Damascus, is that he is speaking about causation and headship. That is to say, just as Adam has a certain priority as the first man from which all others come and as the head of the household or original patriarch (even though all other humans are equal in nature), so the Father is the First Principle of divinity, begetting the Son and outbreathing the Spirit, and this is also why there is a paternal headship even in the Trinity.
When it comes to obedience or doing the will of the Father, earlier writers, such as Justin Martyr or Origen are perfectly comfortable speaking about the Son obeying the will of the Father — as God. And I admit that this early language doesn’t trouble me if understood in keeping with the qualifications of the later fathers. My position is very much like that of Basil on the term “homoiousia”: There’s nothing wrong with the word, but since it has been tainted by the Arians, he’ll relinquish it. Such is my stance on talk of obedience.
Following the Arian dispute, the Eastern fathers became more squeamish about such language, as the quote from John of Damascus shows. But they still recognized a distinction of persons and a distribution of activity or varied roles. In addition, they continue to recognize the Father as the first principle or cause or Monarch. But they move away from obedience language to executing language — the Son naturally executes the will of the Father. The worry, in Basil, about “obey” language seems to be about Arianism, where the Son might be ignorant of the Father’s will without a command or have the type of autonomy that might allow for disobedience. Instead, the Fatter and Son share a common will, such that when the Father wills, it is natural for the Son to execute that will. Such becomes the preferred framing in these later fathers.
However, two things should be noted here. The first is that common will should never be taken to again return to the composite person or hive mind concept. The Eastern fathers consistently qualify the point to insist that the Son really does have the capacity of will, an insistence found in Basil's On the Holy Spirit and Gregory's Great Catechism, for example. In other words, they are concerned to avoid turning the Son into a mindless or will-less appendage — hence always repeating that the Son is not void of will.
Second, and closely related, it is critical to recognize that, according to these same fathers, will belongs to nature but is exercised by a person. The common will is thus an affirmation of a common nature — being divine, or having the divine nature, they have a common divine will, since the divine nature is rational and volitional. But such is true of you and me. Being human, you and I have a common, human will, despite us using or exercising the powers of will differently. In short, will is an abstract power that wills nothing; persons having the volitional nature exercise the power of will. The point is essential to their Christology and understanding of the gospel, where Christ appropriates and heals all aspects of our (common) nature.
Yes, we again get the same caveats noted above: You and I are materially separate and autonomous in ways the Trinity is not. And these differences mean that we might disagree and oppose one another, while such is impossible for the persons of the Trinity. But these caveats do not change the facts that (a) the common nature refers to the fact that divinity is a rational, volitional nature that the three share, just as human nature is a rational and volitional nature that we share, and (b) this abstract nature does not will anything; the persons having it are the ones who will things; so the commonality is not the basis for harmony, as if “common” indicates "composite person" or “hive mind”; rather, the general distinctions between the created and the uncreated noted above are what produce this harmony which is uncharacteristic of creatures.
Given these points, even these later fathers acknowledge that the Son executes or does the will of the Father, acknowledging the Monarchical reality that the will being done originates with the Father. I think obedience is a fine word for such realities, which is why earlier fathers use it. But I also acknowledge that the later fathers are worried about implications attaching to the term because of Arian and other such heretics.
Now, returning to why I find your approach to “correcting me” unhelpful. When you presume your misunderstanding of me or of the fathers is correct and proceed to proclaim in a long thread that I’m ignorant of or misrepresenting the fathers (when I’m neither) followed by a barrage of quotes (with which I’m already familiar), you give the onlooker the impression that you are correct — that I’m ignorant of this or that nuance or have misrepresented the fathers or that your misunderstanding is correct. This forced me into a position of needing to reply at length (as I am now), which is something I don’t have time for, given my more pressing obligations, but feel impelled to do for the sake of the onlooker.
What would be a more sober and useful approach would be something like this: “Dr. Jacobs, when you employ Gregory’s three human persons analogy, do you mean to suggest there are no differences between created hypostases and divine hypostases?” This brief question avoids the false accusation of ignorance and misrepresentation and allows for a concise reply — "Certainly not. See this, this, and this article."
In the future, I would ask that you take this approach.
Dr. Jacobs, somehow we read the same Letter to Ablabius and the same passages from John of Damasc, but understand them differently. Perhaps, st. Gregory Palamas had managed to express the same teaching in a more nuanced manner, so that this time our understanding of what he means will be the same. Please, read a little more quotes below to see, if it will be so or not.
It seems to me, that your comparison with the "hive mind" comes exactly because of what st. Gregory writes about the incomprehensibility of the matter in question: "It is such because it is completely unparticipating. Therefore, not even an example of this can be found in creation". - It may seem to us being something rediculas, but this is a question of faith, of trust to the Holy Fathers, through whom the Holy Spirit speaks. It is a pass between the two extremes: belief in the supersimple Divine Nature with its three inner relations and in "three Gods" in the meaning of three separate hypostases .
The treatise "On Divine Union and Distinction" (35 chapters) was written by St. Gregory Palamas in 1341 and is dedicated to the interpretation of the work "On the Divine Names" from the corpus "Areopagitica". The title of the work in Greek is Ποσαχῶς ἡ θεία ἕνωσις καὶ διάκρισις, καὶ ὅτι μὴ κατὰ τὰς ὑποστάσεις μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὰς κοινὰς προόδους καὶ ἐνεργείας διάκρισιν ἐδιδάχθημεν ἐπὶ θεοῦ, καὶ ὅτι καθ᾿ ἕνωσίν τε καὶ διάκρισιν ἄκτιστον φρονεῖν παρελάβομεν αὐτόν, κἂν Βαρλαὰμ καὶ ᾿Ακίνδυνος ἀπαρέσκωνται.
I haven't found it in English translation, so I have to give these passages in autotranslation from good Russian modern translation, published in 2007(https://azbyka.ru/otechnik/Grigorij_Palama/O_Bogestvennom_soedinenii_i_razdelenii/):
21. However, besides the two aforementioned unions of the Triune Godhead, there also exists a mutual indwelling of the hypostases within each other and perichoris, since They are wholly, constantly, and inseparably embraced by one another, so that the energy of the three hypostases is one. Not as with men, where the action of the three would be similar, but—since each acts independently—it is distinct. Not thus, then, but truly one and the same [energy in Them], since it is one movement of the divine will, produced from the immediately preceding cause, the Father, and sent down through the Son and manifested in the Holy Spirit. And this is evident from the results, for from them, as has been said, every energy becomes manifest. And so, not as with shoemakers, when each shoe is made differently, even though the labors of all of them were directed toward the same goal, so also with the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, the same result is seen from [the activity] of each of the hypostases. But every creation is a single work of Three, and we have learned from the Fathers, when considering it, to think of one and the same divine energy in the three adored Persons, and not distributed among each [of Them]. And since, according to the tradition of theologians, "Divinity" is primarily the name not of the Divine essence, but of Divine energy, we speak of one and the same divinity of the three adored Persons, but of "one" not in the sense of "similar" ( ομοιαν ), as [this is said] about the natural ( φυσικην ) or acquired and achieved by experience activity of three men.
22. So let Barlaam and Akindynos, who declare the very divinity of God in the proper sense to be created, and who madly write that "there is one thing without beginning and without end—the essence of God, and everything outside of it is created nature," understand this also. And also: "the only uncreated divinity is the essence of God, and everything around it is created." For the term "divinity" is the name of the divine energy, proceeding from the Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit and revealed to us through [its] results, and not the name in the proper sense of the word of the divine essence. For energy is the movement of essence, and not the essence [itself]. Whose movement and energy is this? Of God, of course! [...]
25. So, although we say this, everything pertaining to both the essential union and the hypostatic separation, and to the absolutely unconfused and unmixed fusion, remains super-unknowable and super-ineffable («… τα της ουαιωδους ενωσεως και της υποστατικης διακρισεως και τα της αμιγυς πανταπασι και αφυρτου συμφυιας»). It is such because it is completely unparticipating. Therefore, not even an example of this can be found in creation. For what can one say about an essence that cannot be expressed or even contemplated in any way? From this we can also conclude that the interconnection and distinction of the hypostases are completely incomprehensible. There are fathers and sons among us, having one nature, but not inseparable from one another, nor existing in one another. [...]
26. [...] Therefore, the great Dionysius, having resolved this question, then concludes his speech about these [subjects], saying: “Such, then, are the union and separation corresponding to the inexpressible unity”, for it is impossible to name them [starting] from creatures. For this reason, the Deity is above number rather than a monad, since it is not counted among the multitude; and above the monad [It] rather than number, since even in division It does not receive in addition [to Itself] anything else from what is outside, but is an indivisible number. Or rather, It is also one above [the observed] one among existing ones, being the most unique and in the proper sense of the word one, as the super-unit, and is counted, being divided, above all singular ( ενικως ) divided, [as] the only thing that, above all reason and word, ever confirms both the distinction of the united and the unity of the separated.
Firstly, except my apologies! Instead of telling you how your words may be perceived from the outside, I should have considered my own comments in the first place. More delicate and considerate person would represent questions in the manner you described. Alas, I am not such one... But I am learning. And your efforts may do some good in that regard. I am really sorry for forcing you to answer me at length while you don't have time for it!
Secondly, thank you very much for those lengthy replies anyway! Now I understand, how presumptuous I was, thinking that you somehow missed these nuances while I – well, I am another matter, right?! – know it...
The question about obedience is closed. You know even the whole story about how the language of the fathers changed in this regard. Excuse me again for jumping to conclusions!
The question about the mystery of the Holy Trinity remains. It is possible that it is me who may need to correct his view. I have to consider this problem of the hive mind as you called it. I will write you later, if you don't mind. I promise to take your suggestion seriously and try to follow it.
Yours,
Alex!
(Part 1)
Alex, I recognize that your intentions are good — truly — but allow me to explain why I find these lengthy threads unhelpful.
Your “corrections” only illuminate for me how you have misunderstood the source material, misunderstood me, or where you have not listened fully to me. I understand that you intend this to be helpful, giving me a glimpse of how I might be misunderstood, but I don’t presume your misunderstandings are universal or necessarily the product of me failing to be clear on the points in question.
For example, you suggested in your thread on the Trinity two things. The first is that I fail to discuss the fact that the Trinity is undivided, unlike created hypostases of a common nature. Second you claim that the common energies (misrepresented in your comment as numerically one energy) is meant to temper Gregory’s three hypostases analogy. The former point grossly misrepresents my work; the latter misrepresents Gregory.
To the former, i have spoken at great length about the fact that created hypotheses are materially separate, differentiated by material accidents, casually brought about in a per accidens manner, and displaying general autonomy — along with other metaphysical necessities, such as mutability, turnability, temporality, etc. And I have been exceedingly clear that none of this applies to the Holy Trinity: The hypostases are distinct, not separate (explaining perichoresis in this context), distinguished by causal relations rather than material accidents (of which there are none because they are immaterial), displaying a per se casual relationship (as opposed to per accidens), which also entails no autonomy — along with the catalogue of negations, such as immaterial, immutable, atemporal, etc. I go through every one of these at length in my piece of the begotten not made distinction; I discuss these in my article on not there Gods; I explain them in a basic and truncated way (given the target audience) in my piece on understanding the Trinity; I touch on these in all my lectures on the Trinity, including the one published via my podcast. If you’ve missed this, the reason is not due to silence.
As for the point regarding Gregory, first, the energies are common amongst the persons, having a single source, namely the divine nature, but they are numerous — as Basil explains (the essence is one but the energies are many) and Gregory also explains, contra the Eunomians. As for why Gregory brings up the common energies when writing to Ablabius, the reason is not to show how the persons of the Trinity collapse into one or to blur the lines between them. The point is to demonstrate the common nature they share. If you understand what an energy is, then you understand it is an articulation or outward expression or operative power of a nature — and according to the Cappadocians, this is how we come to know a nature (any nature), not by direct access (since we have none), but by inference from its energies. By demonstrating common energies, he demonstrates the common nature of the persons. This is not a distinctive feature of the Trinity, however; you and I have common energies as well because we have a common nature. Now, are there differences between created and uncreated hypostases, including how we exercise our operative powers? Yes, as already noted and as I’ll get to further below. But such is not the purpose of Gregory raising the common energies.
And this goes to a rhetorical reason I begin where I do when discussing the Trinity. The children of Modernity and Latin theology generally have a tendency toward “monotheism,” not as the term is defined by the Eastern fathers (I.e., there is only one divine nature as opposed to several) but as a single subject. Hence there is a tendency to try to collapse the persons into a single person or a single lump called God, as if the persons were parts of a composite whole and this forth fellow is the real God. Such conceptions are false and utterly contrary to the Eastern fathers who are exceedingly clear about the absolute distinction of the persons; the nature is one but the persons are several. Hence, I think it imperative to first break this misconception — or better, smash this idol — and begin with the very analogy the terms used indicate: three subjects of a common nature. (Notice that Gregory’s letter to Ablabius is occasioned by the fact that Ablabius understands precisely what these words mean and thus asks if we believe in three Gods, and Gregory’s reply does not deny the meaning of the terms but only corrects Ablabius’ erroneous metaphysics that call Paul, Timothy, and Silvanus three humans as opposed to one human.) Once this starting point is firmly established, I then move into the sorts of qualifications needed to differentiate the created from the uncreated. But these qualifications should never return one to the idolatrous fourth fellow who represents one composite person or a divine hive mind or any such thing. And the way you characterize things in your concern leads me to suspect that you have such an error at work in your thinking and reading of the fathers.
Alex, I’ll reply to your other string of comments on the Trinity if I have time. But suffice it to say that the previous cluster of comments highlights nuances that I’m neither ignorant of nor silent about. To the contrary, I’ve both published and lectured on such matters. See my recent post on the begotten-not-made distinction, for example, which is a truncated version of my article in Religious Studies. I would add that some of your “corrections” in that thread are inaccurate in their characterization of such nuances — such as your framing of the common energies in Gregory’s letter to Ablabius. As for this comment, again, there is no inaccuracy to be spoken of. John’s point is that Christ really does have a human will that really displays obedience — hence the comment about the real as opposed to unreal will. And this means the person of Christ obeys, not the humanity of Christ, since the exercise of will is by the person who wields it, never by the abstract common power — the alternative being Nestorian. As for whether obedience is rightly ascribed to the instrument of the human will only or the divine as well goes into a nuance about how the fathers address certain seeming contradictions between the divine and the human natures in the person of Christ — compare comments on Christ’s knowledge of the day and hour, as an example, or about growing in wisdom or about the Father being greater than he— and you’ll find there is not uniformity in their “solutions,” and so, I, like them, have preferences concerning the best resolution, though all within the pale of acceptable Eastern patristic norms. While I appreciate your zeal, I don’t find these efforts to “correct” terribly helpful.
Excuse me then for such not asked for corrections! You may at least treat them as an example of what impressions may leave your podcast in the minds of the attentive listeners. There are some nuances which you do not mention, while generally describing the Orthodox theology, but which in my opinion should be mentioned in order to avoid leaving such impressions as I am describing.
Again excuse me and don’t perceive it as me trying to teach you how to make your lectures. I like them very much! I just voice my concerns about some important nuances, which in my opinion may lead the listeners to some non-Orthodox conclusions .
For example, correct me please, if I am mistaken , but the notion about the Son obeying the Father, as I remember, I have heard in your podcast about The Holy Trinity, not about the Incarnation. So I got an impression that you think that the Son obeys the Father always — even before the Incarnation .
Another example is when you do not mention, that in comparison with us The Holy Trinity is not just three hypostases of the same nature, but —inseparable and dwelling one in each other and not numerically countable and therefore one God, which cannot be said about us being separate hypostases of the same nature. And this is the mystery of the Holy Trinity, which disappears when such important distinction is not mentioned. But you promised to answer on this when you have time, maybe I do not understand something and got the wrong impression.
Excuse me again for occupying your time and thank you very much for your work!
Dr. Jacobs, hello and may you have a profitable lent!
I think you are making a very valuable and important work not only for those who may consider converting to Orthodoxy, but also for preserving them from being infected with the unorthodox ideas of the heresy of Ecumenism. May God grant you His help to finish this endeavor!
As your work is huge, no wonder you may overlook some inaccuracies in your explanations, so allow me to sound one particular critical concern.
When you are explaning why there are not three Gods, you appeal to the first part of the famous letter of st. Gregory of Nyssa, but usually do not mention the second part (or you make a very short remark on it, without explaining this argument fully). It leaves an impression that God is not very much different from man, because in both cases the only thing that prevents us from saying "three men" or "three Gods" is the fact that the three hypostases have the same essence and we inaccuratly call three hypostases of the same nature "three men" or "three Gods". The problem is that stopping explanation on this argument elliminates the mystery of the Holy Trinity.
When we are saying "three men", we actually mean three separate hypostases and not three different essences (at least in our age), while the mystery of the Holy Trinity teaches us to believe that uncomprehensable superessential essence of God has corresponding hypostases that dwell one in each other and have one will and one energy! This mystery defies our comprehention and contradicts all our creaturely experience.
Exuse me for reminding you this basics of Orthodox faith, but without actually speaking it out your audience may get a wrong impression, learning to believe in the other extreme: while western Christianity fell into conclusion that there are not three hypostases, but only three inner relations of the Divine nature to itself, your partial explanation may lead to believe, that there are "three Gods" in a meaning of three separate hypostases.
I just want to remind you that this is the main concern and such holy fathers as st. John of Damask and st. Fotius of Konstantinopol, who were summorising the whole Orthodox tradition, were speaking primarily about it.
____________________________________________
Now some quotes from their works:
1) St. John of Damask (On the Orthodox faith)
Chapter 8. Concerning the Holy Trinity
We believe, then, in One God ... one essence, one divinity, one power, one will, one energy, one beginning, one authority, one dominion, one sovereignty, made known in three perfect Hypostases and adored with one adoration, believed in and ministered to by all rational creation, united without confusion and divided without separation (which indeed transcends thought).
...
And just as we say that fire has brightness through the light proceeding from it, and do not consider the light of the fire as an instrument ministering to the fire, but rather as its natural force: so we say that the Father creates all that He creates through His Only-begotten Son, not as though the Son were a mere instrument serving the Father's ends, but as His natural and subsistential force. And just as we say both that the fire shines and again that the light of the fire shines, So all things whatsoever the Father does, these also does the Son likewise. (John 5:19)
...
And again we speak of the three Hypostases as being in each other, that we may not introduce a crowd and multitude of Gods. Owing to the three Hypostases, there is no compoundness or confusion: while, owing to their having the same essence and dwelling in one another, and being the same in will, and energy, and power, and authority, and movement, so to speak, we recognise the indivisibility and the unity of God. For verily there is one God, and His Word and Spirit.
(Or in translation from Russian: "And again we say that the three Hypostases are one within the other, lest we introduce a multitude and crowd of gods. Through the three Hypostases we understand the uncomplex and unmerged; and through the consubstantiality and existence of the Hypostases—one within the other, and the identity of will, activity, strength, power, and, so to speak, movement—we understand the indivisibility and existence of the one God. For truly there is one God, God, and His Word, and His Spirit".)
Concerning the distinction of the three Hypostases: and concerning the thing itself and our reason and thought in relation to it.
One ought, moreover, to recognise that it is one thing to look at a matter as it is, and another thing to look at it in the light of reason and thought. In the case of all created things, the distinction of the hypostasesis observed in actual fact. For in actual fact Peter is seen to be separate from Paul. But the community and connection and unity are apprehended by reason and thought. For it is by the mind that we perceive that Peter and Paul are of the same nature and have one common nature. For both are living creatures, rational and mortal: and both are flesh, endowed with the spirit of reason and understanding. It is, then, by reason that this community of nature is observed. For here indeed the hypostases do not exist one within the other. But each privately and individually, that is to say, in itself, stands quite separate, having very many points that divide it from the other. For they are both separated in space and differ in time, and are divided in thought, and power, and shape, or form, and habit, and temperament and dignity, and pursuits, and all differentiating properties, but above all, in the fact that they do not dwell in one another but are separated. Hence it comes that we can speak of two, three, or many men.
And this may be perceived throughout the whole of creation, but in the case of the holy and superessential and incomprehensible Trinity, far removed from everything, it is quite the reverse. For there the community and unity are observed in fact, through the co-eternity of the Hypostases, and through their having the same essence and energy and will and concord of mind, and then being identical in authority and power and goodness — I do not say similar but identical — and then movement by one impulse. For there is one essence, one goodness, one power, one will, one energy, one authority, one and the same, I repeat, not three resembling each other. But the three Hypostases have one and the same movement. For each one of them is related as closely to the other as to itself: that is to say that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one in all respects, save those of not being begotten, of birth and of procession. But it is by thought that the difference is perceived. For we recognise one God: but only in the attributes of Fatherhood, Sonship, and Procession, both in respect of cause and effect and perfection of Hypostasis, that is, manner of existence, do we perceive difference. For with reference to the uncircumscribed Deity we cannot speak of separation in space, as we can in our own case. For the Hypostases dwell in one another, in no wise confused but cleaving together, according to the word of the Lord, I am in the father, and the father in Me (John 14:11): nor can one admit difference in will or judgment or energy or power or anything else whatsoever which may produce actual and absolute separation in our case. Wherefore we do not speak of three Gods, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, but rather of one God, the holy Trinity, the Son and Spirit being referred to one cause, and not compounded or coalesced according to the synæresis of Sabellius. For, as we said, they are made one not so as to commingle, but so as to cleave to each other, and they have their being in each other without any coalescence or commingling. Nor do the Son and the Spirit stand apart, nor are they sundered in essence according to the diæresis of Arias. For the Deity is undivided among things divided, to put it concisely: and it is just like three suns cleaving to each other without separation and giving out light mingled and conjoined into one. When, then, we turn our eyes to the Divinity, and the first cause and the sovereignty and the oneness and sameness, so to speak, of the movement and will of the Divinity, and the identity in essence and power and energy and lordship, what is seen by us is unity. But when we look to those things in which the Divinity is, or, to put it more accurately, which are the Divinity, and those things which are in it through the first cause without time or distinction in glory or separation, that is to say, the Hypostases of the Son and the Spirit, it seems to us a Trinity that we adore. (Or in translation from Russian: then there will be Three [Persons] Whom we worship.)
to be continued...
Chapter 10. Concerning divine union and separation.
... Further, the true doctrine teaches that the Deity is simple and has one simple energy, good and energising in all things, just as the sun's ray, which warms all things and energises in each in harmony with its natural aptitude and receptive power, having obtained this form of energy from God, its Maker.
But quite distinct is all that pertains to the divine and benignant incarnation of the divine Word. For in that neither the Father nor the Spirit have any part at all, unless so far as regards approval and the working of inexplicable miracles which the God-Word, having become man like us, worked, as unchangeable God and son of God.
from Chapter 12
Wherefore, of the divine names, some have a negative signification, and indicate that He is super-essential: such are "non-essential"... Some again have an affirmative signification, as indicating that He is the cause of all things. For as the cause of all that is and of all essence, He is called both Ens and Essence. ... These, then, are the affirmations and the negations, but the sweetest names are a combination of both: for example, the super-essential essence, the Godhead that is more than God, the beginning that is above beginning and such like.
God then is called Mind and Reason and Spirit and Wisdom and Power, as the cause of these, and as immaterial, and maker of all, and omnipotent. And these names are common to the whole Godhead, whether affirmative or negative. And they are also used of each of the hypostases of the Holy Trinity in the very same and identical way and with their full significance. For when I think of one of the hypostases, I recognise it to be perfect God and perfect essence: but when I combine and reckon the three together, I know one perfect God. For the Godhead is not compound but in three perfect hypostases, one perfect indivisible and uncompound God. And when I think of the relation of the three hypostases to each other, I perceive that the Father is super-essential Sun, source of goodness, fathomless sea of essence, reason, wisdom, power, light, divinity: the generating and productive source of good hidden in it. He Himself then is mind, the depth of reason, begetter of the Word, and through the Word the Producer of the revealing Spirit.
From Chapter 13.
... The Son is from the Father, and derives from Him all His properties: hence He cannot do ought of Himself. For He has not energy peculiar to Himself and distinct from the Father.
+ + +
2) Saint Photius, Patriarch of Constantinople (from Amphilochius in translation from Russian)
Question 182. How do we say that the Deity is one and three?
... That the Trinity is not countable in the proper sense, can be seen from what has been said above, and various other considerations also show. For with regard to those who are countable in the proper sense, such as, say, men or angels or many other things, we can say both "a trinity of angels" and "a trinity of men," but also "three angels," "three men." But of the Most Holy Trinity, which surpasses all understanding and all number, no pious person would say either "a trinity of Gods" or "three Gods." Again, the Persons in the Most Holy and life-giving Trinity, preserving [Their] peculiarities inviolable and untouchable, seem to permeate one another (ὡς δι᾿ ἀλλήλων χωρεῖ): the Father fulfills all things, the Son fulfills all things, and so does the Holy Spirit; and vice versa, where the Spirit is present, there is also the Son and the Father, but also in that in which the Son is present, with Him are both the Father and the Spirit, and among those who are numbered in the proper sense, one cannot even think of anything like that.
Moreover, among the properly numbered, there is both addition and subtraction of numbers, but how can this even be conceived of in the superessential and incomprehensible Trinity? And much more could be imagined.
How can I buy this course from Russia? I have been trying to get a subscription, but there was no available way of paying. We are placed here under a collective responsibility...
Maybe I will be able to pay through my friend, but how can I let you know, that it is me, who has signed up for the series East and West and not my friend?
Hey Alex, send an email to thenathanjacobspodcast@gmail.com to let me know your friend's name and I'll make a note. I'd love to make it easier for people to purchase with us internationally. I'll have to look into this. Thank you so much for your support!