The following letter is written to a reader who reached out to me. Following his kind words about my work, he shared with me the ways in which the realities of slavery, polygamy, and genocide in the Old Testament have shaken his faith. He asked if I might be able to offer some insights on how best to understand such topics, with special attention to the Eastern Church fathers. This initial letter covers only the first of his questions — the realities of slavery in the Bible. Time permitting, I’ll produce an additional letter or two on the subsequent two topics.
Given the length of this first letter, I split it into two parts. Part 1 explores the question of what one means by the word slavery and what makes slavery wrong. In that first installment, I lay out five traits of slavery that plague the modern imagination and offer a moral assessment according to the moral realism of Natural Law. After showing that these traits are, in fact, immoral, I go on to ask whether such traits are essential or accidental properties of slavery. If you have yet to read Part 1, please do so, as this provides important context for the remainder of the letter.
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If you have not yet, please read Part 1.
Dear “Samuel” (continued):
Having answered the question of whether slavery is morally repugnant — and why — we face a new question: Are these traits essential or accidental to slavery?
I brushed up against the distinction between essential and accidental properties above, but because it is now particularly relevant, allow me to briefly define those terms. An essential property is part of the very definition of the thing in question. For example, a square has four sides, four right angles, and all sides are equal in length. If we negate any of these, we no longer have a square — hence, essential property. An accidental property, by contrast, is extrinsic to the nature and is thus immaterial to the nature of the thing and subject to change without doing violence to the nature in question. For example, whether a square is blue or green has no bearing on whether it is a square; whether it is one foot or one-hundred feet is immaterial to whether it is a square.
With this in mind, my question is one about the definition of slavery. Do the above five traits constitute essential or accidental properties of slavery?
My guess is that most folks today presume these properties are essential, which is why they think the immorality of slavery is prime facie. For my part, I do not have strong convictions about the best way to define the word. So rather than quibbling about definitions, allow me a different question. But my question requires a hypothetical.
Let’s imagine that I have loaned you a large sum of money, which you’ve agreed to pay back. And let’s imagine that after running the numbers on your present payment plan, you realize that it will take you several decades to repay the sum — your current expenses leaving very little room for excess that you might send my way. So, you approach me with a proposition. Knowing that I have a guest house on my property, you ask if you, your wife, and children can move into that guest house and work for me full time. When you calculate the value of the work and subtract it from the sum you owe me, this trade will allow you to pay me back in, say, seven years. Your proposal, then, is precisely that: Allow you to live on my land, work for me for free, and I provide room and board in return, and at the close of seven years, I count your debt paid in full. Now, in addition, we set certain ground rules. I can correct and discipline you, as I would any employee, but I can’t brutalize you or harm you. In fact, if I lose my temper and strike you, damaging your eye or some such thing, that constitutes a violation of our arrangement, and you’re free to go — debt forgiven. Moreover, the room and board you provide needs to be up to a basic standard of living suitable to any landlord in the area. After you make your pitch, I agree to your terms, and we enter into this arrangement for the next seven years.
My questions are two. The first is this. Would this be an immoral relationship? For my part, I see nothing about it that appears immoral. Replying to my own question, then, I would answer No. The arrangement is freely entered into by both parties and two mutually benefit, while preserving the dignity of all parties and harmonizing with both the duties and rights of all involved. I see here no violation of nature.
This brings me to my second question. Is this type of arrangement slavery? Now, if we answer the second question in the affirmative, then the implication is that some forms of slavery are immoral — such as the type described by our five conditions — and some are moral — such as the arrangement just described. While I’m open to the possibility that the word “slavery” could be defined in a way broad enough to include both types of arrangements, I candidly think the term slavery is so radioactive in our culture that few could successfully excise from the word the five traits mentioned above. I think, within our own time and place, those traits are reflexively imagined when the word is uttered. For that reason, I would rather not banter about the proper definition of the term and instead use two different words.
Let’s grant that “slavery” entails the five above traits. Because our alternative arrangement involves none of these essential properties, we’ll name this hypothetical arrangement “servitude.” The implication is that slavery is immoral but servitude is moral.
The question that naturally follows is this. When the Bible speaks about certain types of arrangements that translators label “slavery,” is the translation accurate? Is the arrangement described in the text one of servitude or slavery? For my part, I think the answer is servitude. When you look at the Old Testament stipulations about “slavery,” the laws are more akin to the sort of hypothetical arrangement I offered above than to what an American imagines when hearing the word “slavery.” There are limits on disciplinary measures and other harsh treatments of “slaves.” There are strict penalties for violating these boundaries, such as giving to the “slave” his freedom. There are limits for the duration of said arrangements. There are stipulations about provisions. We even find guidelines for scenarios where the “slave” insists that he loves his “master” and does not want to be set loose but remain with his “master” — a scenario that implies an arrangement so favorable that some would prefer to extend it in perpetuity than terminate the arrangement. When I consider these Mosaic laws, I see something better labeled servitude than slavery.
In addition, we find that such arrangements were often predicated on the very type of situation outlined above, namely, debt. In the Ancient Near East, few options presented themselves for resolving insurmountable debt. The servitude arrangement was meant to offer an amicable solution, akin to my above hypothetical. Just as in my hypothetical, the arrangement is not predicated on abduction and coercion but is an arrangement freely entered into to resolve an economic dispute. And as already noted, the Hebrews were reminded in their own laws of their time in slavery under the Egyptians, where they were dealt with harshly and brutalized, and these reminders were meant to temper their treatment of servants to avoid slipping from servitude into slavery.
It is noteworthy, of course, that the Exodus itself is prompted by divine compassion for his people whose cries of oppression reached him — a fact that makes it difficult to suggest the Hebrew God is favorably disposed toward what we have defined as slavery.
All of this is to say, I think the practice we call to mind when hearing or reading the word “slavery” is not the thing practiced by the Hebrews. Or rather, were it ever practiced by the Hebrews, it would have been practiced in violation of their own laws, which condoned servitude, not slavery. Admittedly, I suspect one may still take issue with particular laws within the Law of Moses that appear (to a modern reader) morally questionable. However, to raise such particularities carries us into a new (and lesser) objection than the one with which we began. That is to say, our question was whether the OT advocates “slavery,” a practice we identified by five essential traits that are absent from the OT practice. So, the new and lesser objection is why the Hebrew laws about servitude, which is morally permissible, allows for this or that concession. I’m happy to explore such particularities, but I think it is important acknowledge that, in doing so, we are no longer exploring a question about slavery.
Now, what are we to make of the mentions of “slavery” in early Christianity, and specifically within the Christian East? I think the early Christian reaction to slavery in its own time and culture reflects the very dynamics already discussed. What I mean is this.